The irritation of doubt: When is it OK to scratch your beliefs? by Paglieri, Fabio
Chapter 6
The irritation of doubt: When is it OK to
scratch your beliefs?
Fabio Paglieri
Abstract Building upon Peirce’s notion of “the irritation of doubt”, I outline
the role doubts play in belief formation, drawing a distinction between two
different phenomena: Peirceandoubts and scarydoubts. I argue that the former
are an essential and useful ingredient in our belief dynamics, whereas the latter
are potentially dangerous and yet unavoidable biases, even though they might
occasionally be redeemed by their practical merits. This analysis is intertwined
with Castelfranchi’s views on belief formation and goal processing, with the
aim of highlighting a common root between pragmatism and goal theory, and
to provide a unifying picture of the mind as a goal-directed, coherence-seeking
control system.
1 Introduction
In one of his many illuminating passages, Peirce observed that «the action of
thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases when belief is attained;
so that the production of belief is the sole function of thought» (1958, p. 118).1
Nowadays “thought” is called cognition and is no longer conceived as per-
taining solely or even mainly to the production of belief. Nevertheless, there
is still much to be learned from Peirce’s remark, as well as good chances of
misunderstanding its meaning. In what follows I try to elucidate both Peirce’s
insight and some misconception that might plague it, and to stress its connec-
tions with Cristiano Castelfranchi’s own views on belief dynamics and, to a
minor extent, goal dynamics. Thiswill serve not only to build a bridge between
Fabio Paglieri
Goal-Oriented Agents Lab (GOAL), Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, CNR,
Italy
e-mail: fabio.paglieri@istc.cnr.it
1 Originally published as “How to make our ideas clear” in Popular Science Monthly 12
(January 1878), pp. 286-302.
103
104 Fabio Paglieri
the father of semiotics and the father of goal theory, but also to formulate a
general hypothesis on the main function of the mind.
So, what kind of doubt works as an irritant for cognition, according to
Peirce? As it has been noted before (Thagard 2004; Magnani 2009; Magnani
and Bertolotti 2011), and as it is clear from the rest of Peirce’s essay, he is not
referring to some kind of Hamletic doubt on ontological or moral dilemmas
(“To be or not to be?”), nor to the all-encompassing Skeptical doubt, but rather
to mundane doubts concerning practical matters: it is the kind of doubt we
encounter when we are presented with any ambiguous or unclear situation
that requires us to form an opinion2 on the facts in order to act accordingly
and, if we are right, adequately. It is the doubt we face when we wonder about
the nature of tonight’s party to decide what to wear, or about the likelihood of
rain in the afternoon to choose whether to take the umbrella in the morning,
or about the meaning of our boss’ remark to find a suitable response, or about
the relative merits and shortcomings of various candidates in an election to
establish how to vote. These are the kind of doubts that, according to Peirce,
prompt our cognition to operate and move towards a certain state of belief.
Let us call them Peircean doubts, for the sake of simplicity.
Now, it should be clear that Peircean doubts are an irritant insofar as they
are impractical: the subject needs to know what to do, and for that s/he must
move beyond the current state of doubt and reach some belief on the issue
at hand, no matter how temporary. It should also be clear, though, that there
is another type of doubts, which are not those contemplated by Peirce here,
and that these doubts can also work as an irritant, but in a very different
(and stronger) sense. I am referring to those doubts that threaten one’s self
image and/or social image, such as doubting one’s professional or relational
adequacy, moral fiber, religious faith, ethical values, personal engagements
with family and friends, and the like. Let us call them scary doubts, because
that is what they do: they scare the person into believing something, often (not
always) with little regard for evidence, because the persistence of doubt would
be painful or otherwise distasteful for the subject.
This distinction is relevant because Peircean doubts are not scary doubts,
and their respective effects on cognition should not be confused. Yet it is
easy to confuse them, since both types of doubt pressure the mind towards
belief: but they do so in different ways, for different reasons, and serving
different functions. While the exact differences between Peircean doubts and
scary doubts will be the topic of the next sections, I want to anticipate their
crucial difference. The influence of Peircean doubts is a fact of life, and Peirce
was absolutely right to remind us that our strife for belief is essentially a
response to the (practical) irritation they cause to our cognitive system: we
need to reach a somewhat stable assessment of reality, even if precarious
and fallible, in order to operate effectively, so it is unsurprising and certainly
adaptive that our cognition evolved to answer that need. But the influence of
scary doubts on belief formation and change (or lack thereof) is something that
needs to be proven, and indeed Iwill review some evidence about it.Moreover,
2 To Peirce, famously, this process was mainly one of abduction: for present purposes, how-
ever, it is unimportant what kind of inferential mechanism is involved in belief formation.
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even after establishing that some of our beliefs are born out of fear rather than
reason, this does not imply at all that fear-induced belief formation is a “good
thing”, eithermorally, rationally, or adaptively. Arguments are needed for each
of these claims, and in what follows I will try to assess their merits and limits.
For the time being, let us just emphasize that Peirce’s thesis on the role of doubt
in prompting cognition towards belief was intended for (and makes sense of)
practical doubts on mundane matters, not scary doubts on issues of personal
relevance.
2 Peircean doubts, epistemic bubbles and degrees of belief
Let us define a Peircean doubt as follows:
PROPOSITION 1 (Peircean doubt) An agent X has a Peircean doubt on the issue
P when (i) X is undecided regarding whether P or not-P is the case, and (ii) X needs
to reach a temporary conclusion on P in order to act in the pursue of X’s goals.
Most emphatically,
COROLLARY 1 It is not required that X has anything of importance at stake in
resolving the current state of doubt one way or another, aside from being able to act.
Peircean doubts are minor inconveniences that we encounter in the ongoing
transition from ideation to realization of our daily deeds: for a variety of
reasons (ignorance, uncertainty, forgetfulness, perceptual limits, etc.), we find
ourselves with some gaps in the list of things we need to command in order to
plan a certain action, and these gaps have to be fixed immediately and without
much conscious effort or reflection. Repairing Peircean doubts typically does
not involve any sophisticated reasoning task: agents take them in stride and
simply assignavalue to thepreviouslyundecided item, basedonother relevant
knowledge and (if pertinent) past experience. Interestingly, the agent treats
the solution to a Peircean doubt as something well established (well enough
to warrant acting upon it), and yet has no reservation in reconsidering it –
that is, the kind of belief prompted by the irritation of Peircean doubts is not
particularly resistant to update and change.
As a case in point, imagine that Luigi goes to the train station in Rome
with the aim of taking the 11:00 am express train to Naples: upon entering the
station at 10:45 am, Luigi looks up at the electronic board listing all departing
trains and their platforms. To his dismay, the 11:00 am is listed as on time,
but no platform is yet indicated, leaving Luigi in the dark on where to go
(a typical instance of Peircean doubt). Since Luigi frequently takes this train
from this station, he happens to know that (i) the train typically leaves from
platform 20B, and (ii) the electronic board is often defective and does not show
the platform until the very last moment. Without hesitation, Luigi solves his
Peircean doubt by assuming that today the train will leave from platform 20B,
and thus proceeds in that direction. At this point, Luigi is quite firm in his
conviction that he is moving in the right direction, and he is certainly willing
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to act upon this notion. But clearly this would not preclude him from changing
his mind in the blink of an eye, should further considerations come into play –
e.g., an audio announcement informing passengers that the 11:00 am train to
Naples is leaving from platform 7C. Even more importantly, we find nothing
to object in Luigi’s beliefs and actions, and in fact there would be nothing to
fault in his reasoning even if the right platform number turned out not to be
20B.
As the example shows, there are several typical features of Peircean doubts
and of the beliefs originated by them:
1. Peircean doubts need to be solved as a matter of practical necessity;
2. solving them does not serve to alleviate any special concern of the agent,
but merely to enable some practical course of action;
3. the resulting belief is sufficient to warrant acting upon it – in fact, war-
ranting action is the reason why the irritation of Peircean doubt has to be
satisfied;
4. the resulting belief is perfectly defeasible, and the agent has no special
resistance to change it, if given reasons to do so.
Considering the strong emphasis placed on practical reasoning and action
execution in this analysis of Peircean doubts, one might be tempted to suggest
that perhaps belief is not the right mental attitude to invoke as their solution
– contra Peirce’s original suggestion. If all that really matters in these cases is
to take as granted something (temporarily) in order to act, then it would seem
that these are instances of acceptance rather than belief, in the sense proposed,
among others, by Cohen (1989) and Bratman (1992). Elsewhere (Paglieri 2009) I
have argued that this pragmatic notion of acceptance is not especially helpful,
since it is redundant with respect to explanations based on beliefs and goals:
whenever it is tempting to say that the agent is in a state of acceptance of p
(in our example, accepting that the train will leave on platform 20B), it is also
the case that the agent’s actions can be as easily (and more parsimoniously)
explained in terms of doxastic and motivational attitudes – in Luigi’s case, it
would be natural to say that he wants to catch the train and, based on his past
knowledge of Rome train station, he believes running to platform 20B is the
most sensible course of action. So making too much of pragmatic acceptance
does not grant us any special insight on the agent’s cognitive practices – or so
I claim (for further arguments and details, see Paglieri 2009).
Another tempting equivocation of Peircean doubts is the idea that our ten-
dency to quench their irritation creates a special vulnerability to our doxastic
practices, making us prone to believe much more than we should, given ex-
tant evidence. This interpretationwouldbecome especially pernicious if paired
with John Woods’ notion of epistemic bubbles (2005), that is, the observation that
knowledge and belief are, in many cases, indistinguishable from a first person
perspective. If Peircean doubts made us prone to generate hasty beliefs, and
if epistemic bubbles made us mistake such beliefs for knowledge, then our
predicament would seem dire indeed. Fortunately, neither Peircean doubts
nor epistemic bubbles have anything to do with any special vulnerability of
our cognitive practices. Let us see why.
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Woods’ reflections on epistemic bubbles stems from an observation on the
phenomenology of knowledge: whenever we think we know that p, this state
is indistinguishable for us from the state of actually knowing that p. There is
nothing to tell apart the experience of knowing that p from the experience of
thinking to know that p: in fact, these two experiences are identical, from afirst-
person perspective. Of course, from a third-person perspective it is perfectly
clear (with variations, depending on your favored epistemology) what is that
distinguishes thinking to know that p from actually knowing that p: but a
third-person perspective is precisely what we cannot have concerning our
own knowledge states, and the point Woods is making is that, no matter your
preferred epistemology, you will remain blind on whether you actually know
that p or you just think you know it. In his apt metaphor, we are all caught in
an epistemic bubble, defined as follows:
A cognitive agent X occupies an epistemic bubble precisely when he is unable to
command the distinction between his thinking that he knows P and his knowing
P. Corollary: When in an epistemic bubble, cognitive agents always resolve the
tension between their thinking that they know P and their knowing P in favour of
knowing that P (2005, p. 740).
A careless reader might interpret the epistemic bubble thesis as simply
saying that people often mistake beliefs for knowledge, thus overestimating
the quality of their doxastic states. But nothing of the sort is implied here. First
of all, the thesis is restricted to those beliefs that are experienced as knowledge
by the agent (as in “I know the bus will arrive”, “I know what is best for my
children”, “I know you cannot mean harm to me”, and the like), and it is not
meant to be true for all senses of the word “belief” – most notably, it is not
meant to be true for (weak) gradual beliefs, suspicions, hunches, and the like
(on this point, see Woods 2005, p. 744).3 Secondly, experiencing something as
being known does not necessarily imply being entrenched in this conviction,
according to Woods (and I agree): it is a common experience to take something
as being known one moment, and then abandon it without regret as soon as its
inadequacy becomes apparent. That is, finding out that something we thought
to know was actually mistaken (hence not known at all) is no big surprise for
any minimally self-reflective agent, and does not typically cause any major
discomfort. In fact, we are so jaded with respect to the volatility of our claims
to knowledge precisely because we are accustomed to living in an epistemic
bubble, and we have learned to tolerate well our incapacity to tell apart true
knowledge from the mere appearance of it.
3 Actually, Woods would probably go further and claim that many things often labeled as
beliefs in the literature do not deserve that label, and would instead be better classified as
other kinds of mental attitudes, e.g. suspecting that p, being willing to bet on p, finding
plausible that p, and so on (2005, p. 744-745). This view is consistent with Bas van Fraassen’s
invitation to endorse a more liberal descriptive epistemology, one that admits of greater
variety than just belief, disbelief or neutrality (2001, p. 165). While I agree that we should
remain open-minded on what mental states to include in our epistemology, I also think
that Ockham’s razor should shave our liberal inclinations here, and that mental attitudes
should not be multiplied without cause. Since using “belief” in its more general sense has
no significant repercussion for current purposes, here I will stick to this traditional usage.
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The crucial point is that the subjective strength of our convictions does
not depend on them being experienced as knowledge rather than belief –
contra the epistemologist’s prejudice according to which knowledge is some-
thing more/better than belief (e.g., true justified belief, in the most widespread
recipe). Woods’ notion of epistemic bubbles is not committed to such preju-
dice: it is a thesis on the fact that the distinction between belief and knowledge,
perfectly intelligible in a third-person perspective, is immaterial from a first-
person perspective, but it does not imply that the agent will become fixated
on whatever beliefs s/he misattributes as knowledge.
So, what is the right way of connecting Peircean doubts with epistemic
bubbles, if any? There is a thin but clear link: it could very well be the case that
our tendency to take belief as knowledge is inspired by the practical need for
a partially stable (and quick) assessment of reality, as emphasized by Peircean
doubts. Second-guessing what we think to know is, in general, the wrong way
of reacting to a Peircean doubt: whether that knowledge will turn out to be
correct or not is relevant only to the extent that the resulting action will end up
being successful – and if it does, that is all that matters to the agent. This is why
issues of justification (in the sense of having a good case for p, not just a cause
for believing p; see Woods 2005, pp. 759-761) becomes typically irrelevant to
consider, or at least secondary.
But it is certainly not the case that Peircean doubts plus epistemic bubbles
imply belief rigidity. This is not the case because knowledge does not dif-
fer from belief in terms of doubt-resolution: believing that p solves Peircean
doubts about p as effectively as knowing that p, from a first-person perspective
(precisely due to our epistemic embubblement). The difference between belief
and knowledge is in terms of objective truth and valid justification, and it is a
difference that, according to Woods, we have trouble grasping in a first-person
perspective. So Peircean doubts and epistemic bubbles can happily co-exist,
without engendering any special risk of tunnel vision or cognitive fixation.
For the same reasons, Peircean doubts and epistemic bubbles do not (and are
not meant to) offer an explanation to extant cases of unreasonable resistance
to changes in one’s beliefs. For a diagnosis of such cases, one has to look at
scary doubts and their impact on belief formation: this will be the business of
the next section.
Before moving on to that, however, it is interesting to put Peircean doubts
in contact with the idea that, in believing that p, extant evidence on p produces
a lower and an upper boundary for our degree of belief in p, and the interval
between such boundaries represents the agent’s ignorance on p – in the vein
of Dempster (1967) and Shafer (1976). The interesting psychological twist in
looking at beliefs that way is that whatever assignment of confidence x to p
within p’s ignorance interval is compatible with the existing evidence, hence
legitimate. In other words, it is not a matter of evidence whether the agent
believes more or less strongly that p, within the current ignorance interval for
p. What is the import of that for Peircean doubts? Simply put, it allows us to
speculate the following:
6 The irritation of doubt: When is it OK to scratch your beliefs? 109
PROPOSITION 2 (Peircean confidence) When faced by a Peircean doubt on p
and with an ignorance interval for p equal to [A, Z], solve the doubt by setting the
degree of belief in p to the upper boundary Z.
Let us see how Peircean confidence might work in our train example. We
will stipulate that Luigi’s past experience in taking the 11:00 am train to Naples
from Rome provides a lower boundary for the belief “The train will leave from
platform 20B” equal to 0.5: that is, current evidence does not justify being more
skeptical than that on platform 20B being the right one. On the other hand,
Luigi did experienceunexpected last-minute changes of platform in thepast, so
let us say that his upper boundary for that belief is equal to 0.9: that is, current
evidence does not justify being more certain than that about the rightness of
that belief. Peircean confidence predicts that Luigi will automatically set his
belief to the highest justified degree – in this case, 0.9. Interestingly, this view
explains both the fact that the agent is ready to act on beliefs prompted by
Peircean doubts (unless there is strong evidence against them, i.e. the upper
boundary is too low to warrant action), the fact that doing so is perceived
as fully rational (as it is, in the sense of being within the boundaries of what
is permissible, given current evidence), and the fact that even discovering
such beliefs to be false is not so shocking, since they were conceived from
the start as an informed guess under conditions of partial ignorance. Indeed, a
subsequent change of beliefwouldbe surprising for the agent only if it revealed
the original boundaries to be mistaken: for instance, if Luigi discovered from
a train assistant that the 11:00 am train to Naples in fact never or rarely leaves
from platform 20B, this would give him pause, and rightly so. But the conflict
here would not be with the belief that today the train is leaving from platform
20B, but rather with the past evidence that Luigi used to reach that belief. And
Luigi would have solid reasons to be puzzled, because in this case either the
new information is mistaken, or what he thought was good evidence in fact
wasn’t.
Even if Peircean confidenceworkswell in this example, itmight be defective
as a generalization of how we react to Peircean doubts. For instance, one might
object that Peircean confidence, once applied to issues on which there is no
evidence for or against, delivers the counterintuitive verdict that we should
have full belief in such matters, since their ignorance interval is [0, 1]. To
this, there are two answers: first, complete ignorance on an issue relevant
for Peircean doubt occurs more rarely than one might expect; secondly, it is
reasonable to assume that, when faced with contradictory beliefs, one will
endorse only those with the higher degree, and none at all if they are all evenly
matched. Under this assumption, full credence for states we are ignorant about
becomes unproblematic, as we shall see.
Let us start from the first point, using again Luigi’s predicament as a case
in point. A critic of Peircean confidence may be tempted to reason as fol-
lows: Luigi is completely ignorant on whether the 11:00 am train to Naples
may leave from any platform different from 20B, hence he should believe (for
Peircean confidence) that the train will leave from any of those platforms with
degree 1, which is greater than 0.9 – hence Luigi should prefer to run for any
platform, except the one he knows it is likely the train will leave from. This
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is paradoxical, thus Peircean confidence is mistaken as a general criterion.
However, this argument is clearly flawed, because Luigi is not at all ignorant
on whether the train will leave from any of the other platforms: the very fact
that he has evidence of platform 20B being the right one is evidence against the
train leaving fromanother platform; conversely,whatever evidence against the
train leaving from platform 20B is evidence in favor of the train leaving from
somewhere else. In short, the belief “The train will leave from platform X”,
with X being any platform other than 20B, in this example has the ignorance
interval [0.1, 0.5], hence it is to be believed, by Peircean confidence, with degree
0.5, which is lower than 0.9 and explains why Luigi runs towards platform 20B
and nowhere else.
The second point is more delicate. Imagine an issue p for which there is
indeed full ignorance, and yet such as it raises a Peircean doubt – for instance,
you are considering whether to buy at a certain price a toy for your niece, and
you do not have any clue on whether that price is appropriate or not.4 Now,
in this case your ignorance interval on “The price is right” is [0, 1], so Peircean
confidence would have you giving full credence to it, hence buying the toy
without a moment of hesitation – which does not seem the right option, given
your utter ignorance on the matter (after all, the toy may be outrageously
over-priced, for all you know). But on further reflection, it is obvious that also
the ignorance interval for the contrary belief “The price is not right” is [0, 1],
hence Peircean confidence would command full credence for this belief too.
But you cannot have it both ways, hence Peircean confidence leaves you with
no clue on what to do – which is precisely what should happen, assuming
you are indeed totally ignorant on the matter. That is, Peircean doubts under
conditions of complete ignorance are not meant to be solved.
To seewhy, consider the followingvariation of Luigi’s predicament: imagine
now that Luigi has never taken the 11:00 am train to Naples from Rome and
has no prior information on what platform the train is supposed to leave from
– he is in a state of full ignorance on this issue. Upon looking at the electronic
board and realizing that no platform is indicated there, what should Luigi do,
to behave rationally? Even more crucially, what would you do, if you were in
that situation with a pressing need to catch that train? You would certainly not
start running towards a random platform, nor should Luigi. What you would
do is to accept that your Peircean doubt on the train’s platform currently
has no satisfactory solution, and thus proceed to look for more information –
either waiting in front of the electronic board, hoping the platform number will
soon appear, or going in search of someone who might point you in the right
direction. This is what any reasonable person would (and should) do in a state
of total ignorance, and this is why it is OK for Peircean confidence to leave you
in the dark on what to believe in such cases. Otherwise, Peircean confidence
4 Once again, it is worth emphasizing how unnatural the assumption of total ignorance is,
in matters of Peircean doubts: even if you did not enter a toy shop in your whole life and
were never exposed to the prices of toys (which is unlikely), you would still have a lot of
background experience on what is the value of commodities in general. You would know,
for instance, that a price of 1 billion dollars is excessive for a doll, while a price of 1 cent is
unrealistically cheap – comparisons with the price of other goods would be enough to give
you evidence for such rough estimates.
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would in fact become overconfidence, which is not a reasonable reaction to
Peircean doubts.
In light of these considerations, it is possible to propose a revised version of
Peircean confidence, to better accommodate cases of complete ignorance:
PROPOSITION 3 (Peircean confidence revised) When faced by aPeircean doubt
on p, consider all the candidate beliefs pi that would solve that doubt, each of them
with a respective ignorance interval [Ai, Zi]i. Then take only the candidate (or the
internally consistent subset of candidates) that has the highest upper boundary, and
believe it with a degree equal to such upper boundary. If there are two or more con-
flicting candidates that share the same upper boundary, do not believe anything at all
on the issue at hand and look for more information.
The morale of these reflections is that Peircean doubts are not solved by
any sleight of hands, such that states of complete ignorance can be magically
turned into full-blown beliefs, while retaining a valid claim to rationality.
What happens is both more mundane and more healthy: Peircean doubts are
solved, whenever possible (to wit, in the absence of total ignorance), by taking
a carefully optimistic outlook on the evidence we already possess and acting
on it.5 This is both optimistic, insofar as we pick the upper boundary of the
current ignorance interval, and careful, because that boundary is still within
what is rational to surmise in light of present evidence. Importantly, this way
of forming defeasible beliefs as a reaction to the irritation of Peircean doubts is
both automatic and effortless – hence the simplicity of the principle of Peircean
confidence.
3 Scary doubts, defensive beliefs and biases
In order to emphasize their difference with Peircean doubts, let us define scary
doubts as follows:
5 It may seem natural to think that this carefully optimistic stance is modulated by personal
inclinations and contextual factors. After all, a very prudent person would be naturally more
reserved in giving credence to things that are uncertain, while special circumstances (e.g.
urgent matters where one lacks better alternatives) may justify acting on wild guesses, even
beyond the upper boundary of one’s ignorance interval. However, I think it is more natural
and more parsimonious to think that these effects concern what we do with our beliefs,
rather than how we form them. Imagine the train scenario happens to Luisa instead of Luigi,
and let us say that Luisa is much more prudent than Luigi: as a result, she does not rush
to platform 20B, but rather waits until the latest possible moment to see what number will
appear on the electronic board. I see no reason to claim that Luisa is any less confident than
Luigi on whether the train will in fact leave from platform 20B, assuming they have the
same evidence: the point is rather that she does not want to take the small risk of running
to the wrong platform, while Luigi accepts it. Even more clearly, the fact that on occasion
acting on a wild guess may be the rational (or even only) option has nothing to do with the
doxastic status of that guess: that is, we do not become any more convinced of a wild guess
just because we decide or are forced to act upon it.
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PROPOSITION 4 (Scary doubt) An agent X has a scary doubt on the issue P
when (i) X is undecided regarding whether P or not-P is the case, and (ii) at least one
of these options would, if believed, undermine some important goals of X.
A scary doubt has no neutral solution for the subject: when I wonder
whether or not my wife loves me, how I answer this doubt deeply affects
my well-being, besides and beyond how it affects my conduct. More generally,
with scary doubts at least one6 of the candidates for belief has a negative im-
pact on the agent’s goals – more precisely, on some important goal of the agent.
This is very different from what happens with Peircean doubts, where solving
the doubt is a matter of practical necessity, but nothing relevant for the agent
is at stake in solving it one way or another (provided such solution turns out
to be pragmatically right).
Scary doubts entertain important relations with a special class of beliefs,
defined as follows:
PROPOSITION 5 (Defensive belief) An agent X has a defensive belief p if be-
lieving p avoids undermining an important goal of X and prevents X from being in a
state of scary doubt on p.7
In order to avert any equivocation, let us first clarify that a belief can be
defensive even if it is held on the ground of legitimate evidence, and not
because of whatever scary doubt it helps keeping at bay. To get back to the
previous example, the belief that my wife loves me is a defensive belief, with
respect to my goal of being loved by her, even if I have perfectly sound reasons
to endorse it: her daily manifestations of devotion, our mutual happiness, the
harmony of our family, and so on. Dropping that belief would hurt me, while
maintaining it prevents that from happening: this fact is independent from
whatever other reason I might have to hold that belief.
In other words, defensive beliefs are a broader category than fear-induced
beliefs, defined as follows:
PROPOSITION 6 (Fear-induced belief) An agent X has a fear-induced belief p
if p is a defensive belief which was formed and/or is maintained, partially or solely, to
avoid undermining an important goal of X and to prevent X from being in a state of
scary doubt on p.
Thedistinction betweendefensive beliefs and their sub-class of fear-induced
beliefs captures the fact that not all defensive beliefs are irrational, in the sense
of lacking proper reasons for being held. Conversely, having proper epistemic
backing does not make a defensive belief any less defensive, since what makes
6 The “at least” specification is needed to cover also cases where many or even all answers
to the doubt are damaging for the agent: e.g., imagine a 50-years-old unemployed man who
never had a sentimental partner in his life, seriously wondering whether his misfortunes
indicate lack of character or some congenital cognitive deficit. We might label these extreme
instances as “scary dilemmas”, and treat them as severe instances of scary doubts.
7 Defensive beliefs are only a type of self-serving beliefs: another obvious candidate are
fulfilling beliefs, that is, beliefs that actually satisfy some important goal of the agent. Since
here I am interested in scary doubts, I will confine my analysis to defensive beliefs, even
though many considerations relevant for them apply also to fulfilling beliefs.
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it so is a relationship with the agent’s goals, not with evidence. Regardless, the
presence of scary doubts create an influence on belief formation that is very
different from the pressure towards belief countenanced by Peircean doubts.
Before discussing the specifics of such influence, there is an interesting
question worth considering, albeit only cursorily: Is it better to live in a state of
scary doubt or to face the worst possible outcome? More precisely: Is a scary
doubt more or less scarier than the conclusion we fear to draw from it? The
question is not idle, as the wife example immediately reveals: it is not at all
clear that a man constantly wondering about his wife’s affection is better off
than another man who firmly believes his wife to be no longer in love with
him. After all, we all have experiences (both first-hand and reported) on how
sometimes fearing something is much worse than facing it – or, as the saying
goes, “the devil is not so black as he is painted”. The same could well apply
to scary doubts: it is perfectly possible that persisting in a state of scary doubt
is no better, subjectively speaking, than reaching a negative conclusion on the
matter in doubt. However, this does not change the basic relation between
scary doubts and defensive beliefs, since the latter solve both the uncertainty
and the fear of the worst. My belief in the love of my wife prevents me both
from worrying about it and from believing that she doesn’t.
But is there any evidence that scary doubts, so defined, have an influence on
our beliefs? Indeed, social psychology abounds of such evidence, and entire
theories have been developed to study and articulate similar effects: in differ-
ent guises and with different emphasis, cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957;
Aronson 1969), confirmation bias (Wason 1960), motivated reasoning (Kunda
1990), self-verification (Swann and Read 1981; Swann 1999), self-enhancement
(Alicke and Sedikides 2011), self-perception (Bem 1967), adaptive preference
formation and“sour grapes” effects (Elster 1983), andgoodold fashionedwish-
ful thinking (Greenwald 1980; Taylor and Brown 1988), they all deal with var-
ious aspects of the influence of scary doubts on belief formation. The strength
and the scariness of such doubts may vary, from the relatively severe (e.g.
in self-verification) to the comparatively mild (e.g. in cognitive dissonance),
yet all these approaches have in common the basic view that beliefs can be
shaped by a pressure to avoid undesirable consequences – that is, a pressure
to avoid jeopardizing one’s goals by coming to believe something we would
not like. Moreover, in all these contexts, albeit with variations, it is assumed
that this influence is partially independent from, and potentially in contrast
with, evidence-based reasons to hold or not a given belief.
My point here is not to review this large literature, but rather to mention
it as proof of the extent to which scary doubts influence belief formation,
and also of the difference between such influence and the impact of Peircean
doubts on our beliefs. In a nutshell, the key distinction is in that scary doubts
pressure us to reach a specific conclusion on the matter under consideration,
whereas Peircean doubts only demand that we reach some conclusion, with
no constraint on which one it should be. This difference is capital, since it
defines scary doubts as biases, whereas Peircean doubts are revealed as mere
expressions of a practical need for information to act upon. Granted, scary
doubts may induce, on occasion or even typically, very beneficial biases, as I
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shall discuss in a moment. But this does not change the fact that their effects are
biases, insofar as they systematically pressure belief formation in a direction
unrelated with considerations of accuracy or evidence.8
Also the converse is true, of course: not all biases are necessarily liabilities
for our cognitive processes – indeed, some biases can be highly advantageous.
This point is often missed in cognitive psychology, where the terms “bias” car-
ries an indisputable negative connotation. For instance, much of the current
tension between the heuristics and biases approach of Kahneman and Tversky
(Kahneman et al. 1982) and the adaptive toolbox idea championed by Gigeren-
zer (Gigerenzer et al. 1999) hinges on considering biases either a negative or
a positive asset for cognition. However, it is possible (and I believe desirable)
to use a neutral notion of bias, as a systematic influence over a certain disposi-
tion which is independent from the typical and/or normatively correct reasons
to hold such disposition – in the case of belief, these typical/correct reasons
would roughly amount to evidence-sensitivity and internal consistency. All
influences that are independent from such considerations and yet typically af-
fect belief formation can legitimately be defined as biases, with no evaluative
judgment attached to this label. In fact, such judgment can only be applied
meaningfully to specific biases or, more precisely, to applications of certain
biases in specific contexts.
This is true also for the kind of defensive biases discussed here, and in par-
ticular for fear-induced beliefs. The general point is rather obvious: defending
something can be good or bad depending on what you defend, and why. For
instance, tampering with one’s own beliefs in order to avoid impairing the
capacity to function effectively (e.g. due to a depressive crisis induced by low
self-esteem) may be a very wise thing to do. More generally and less dramat-
ically, the fact that our goals have a biasing influence on our beliefs can have
beneficial effects on our behavior even when no psychopathology is looming
over us, e.g. in terms of coherence of conduct. As argued in details by Miceli
and Castelfranchi (2012), a more or less acute obsession with preserving a
coherent self-image is a powerful motive to avoid excessive deviations from
one’s typical conduct, thus ensuring greater behavioral stability: whether or
not this turns out to be a good thing depends on whether a given individual
is set upon a virtuous or vicious path of conduct. But the mere fact that our
aspirations can bias our actions, as well as our assessment of such actions,
is an important mechanism to ensure self-reflective forms of action control
(Paglieri and Castelfranchi 2008; Castelfranchi, 2012). And Castelfranchi has
argued (1995), with good reason, that such higher mechanisms for behavioral
regulation enables human beings to achieve feats that would be impossible for
simpler (and thus less biased) creatures.
8 Genuine instances of defensive beliefs should be kept apart from other non-evidential
constraints over belief formation and change, such as ensuringminimal change (Alchourrón,
Gärdenfors and Makinson 1985; Harman 1986). The parsimonious tendency to minimize
the amount of cognitive restructuring required to accommodate new information certainly
exerts a biasing influence over belief dynamics, and this might on occasion have pernicious
effects, even if it is highly convenient on average. But such bias, and others like it, depends
on an imperfect attempt to optimize efficacy and is not born out of fear: thus it does not
relate to scary doubts at all.
6 The irritation of doubt: When is it OK to scratch your beliefs? 115
The pragmatic defense of motivationally biased beliefs presented by Castel-
franchi and colleagues is not new, albeit its details are. The basic rationale of
it is similar to that of William James’ much celebrated essay on “The will
to believe” (1895/1979), and indeed this line of reasoning is deeply rooted in
and inspired by pragmatism. In short, undertaking the best possible course
of action is seen as rationally superior to believing the truth, at least when
these two values come into conflict, as exemplified by Pascal’s famous wager.
The standard counterargument against this defense of defensive beliefs (pun
intended) is that the pragmatic efficacy of such biases do not make them any
more evidence-based or truth-preserving, hence it does not constitute a valid
formof epistemological justification. Amistake of reasoning remains amistake
of reasoning, even if it happens to save your life.
A way out of this objection is to make the legitimacy of motivational biases
conditional on the lack of better epistemological alternatives: when you do
not have ways to solve your doubt on the grounds of evidence, it is rationally
legitimate to let your goals shapeyour beliefs. This is theposition Jameshimself
endorses, when he writes:
Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between
propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on
intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, “Do not decide, but leave
the question open”, is itself a passional decision – just like deciding yes or no –, and
is attended with the same risk of losing the truth (James 1895/1979, p. 11).
In addition to that, James also suggests that instances where belief can be
reached on purely intellectual grounds (i.e. based solely on evidence) are much
rarer than what is usually assumed, even in science,9 so that most of our beliefs
must in fact rely, to some extent, on our volitional dispositions – that is, on
our goals and values.10 Whether or not one agrees with James regarding the
relative infrequency of pure evidence-based belief, it is still possible to endorse
his circumscribed defense of motivation-biased belief: insofar as evidence do
not suggest either belief or disbelief, there is nothing epistemologically wrong
in letting our goals settle our convictions. Towhich a stalwart criticmight object
that lack of epistemological fault does not imply presence of epistemological
merit: granted, there is nothing wrong in letting your goals bias your beliefs in
the absence of evidence, but this is not to say that there is something right in that
process – apart from whatever pragmatic benefits you might achieve, which
is beside the point for our imaginary critic. In this view, proper justification
requires that a belief forming procedure has some epistemic virtue, whereas
9 Although it does not bear on the present discussion, it is worth recalling James’ penetrating
caricature of scientific method, as presented in his essay, since it is still actual nowadays,
possibly more than ever: «The most useful investigator, because the most sensitive observer,
is always he whose eager interest in one side of the question is balanced by an equally keen
nervousness lest he become deceived. Science has organized this nervousness into a regular
technique, her so-called method of verification; and she has fallen so deeply in love with the
method that one may even say she has ceased to care for truth by itself at all. It is only truth
as technically verified that interests her. The truth of truths might come in merely affirmative
form, and she would decline to touch it».
10 For in depth analysis of the complex relationship between goals and values, see Miceli
and Castelfranchi (1989).
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lack of obvious epistemic vice is not a sufficient condition. Hence, the will to
believe would not qualify as proper justification, not even in the absence of
evidence, contra James.
This debate, far from being settled, concerns the normative validity (or lack
thereof) of cognitive biases, in this case the role of scary doubts in prompting
the formation of defensive beliefs: as such, it pertains more to philosophical
epistemology than to psychology. However, also psychologists could (and
often do, see for instance Gigerenzer and colleagues) wonder about the merits
and shortcomings of such biases. For them, the debate ismore naturally framed
in terms of efficacy and adaptation.11 To what extent defensive beliefs happen
to be correct and thus successful in supporting one’s behavior? And is it
possible to track the evolutionary processes that might have produced these
belief-formation practices as an adaptation to certain selective pressures? In
order to address these questions, it is not enough to establish that, in general,
goals do exert a systematic influence over our beliefs: we also need to specify
more clearly what kind of influence is exerted, and what mechanisms are
responsible for it.
Without entering in too much details here, it is fair to say that the work
of Castelfranchi and collaborators provides some guidance in this respect. In
a series of papers devoted to analyze belief dynamics and their interaction
with goals (Castelfranchi 1996; 1997; 2004; Paglieri 2004; 2005; 2006; Paglieri
and Castelfranchi 2005; 2006; 2007), they indicate two distinct ways in which
goals might affect belief:12 relevance and likeability. These are conceived as
properties of information, that is, of data that the agent is aware of without yet
being committed to. Both the relevance and the likeability of an information
are dependent upon the agent’s goals and might influence the likelihood of
believing that information, but they do so in very different ways. More exactly,
relevance is defined as the pragmatic utility of an information, i.e. the number
and value of the (pursued) goals that depend on reaching a conclusion, i.e. a
belief, on that matter; in contrast, likeability is understood as the motivational
appeal of an information, that is, the value of the pursued goal(s) directly
fulfilled by believing it. Likeability arises because, subjectively speaking, a
goal p is satisfied only when the agent believes p, whether or not such belief
is factually correct – in short, goals are satisfied by beliefs, not by states of
the world. This puts a definite pressure on believing certain things to be true,
insofar as doing so would directly and immediately satisfy the agent’s current
goals. Relevance, on the other hand, works very differently: it directs our
attention towards certain information rather than others, depending on current
needs, but without pressuring us to believe them. This still has a definite
influence on belief formation, since it determines what contents come to be
11 It is worth emphasizing that there is an intriguing, yet largely unexplored continuity
between the pragmatist focus on practical success and the evolutionary concern with the
adaptive value of certain behaviors or traits. Even though these are different notions used in
different debates within different disciplines, they share the same core: the idea that success
(pragmatic in one case, evolutionary in the other) is the ultimate end, whereas truth is just a
means for it.
12 For the converse path of influence, i.e. from beliefs to goals, see Castelfranchi and Paglieri
(2007).
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considered as candidates for belief, but does not make us any less prone to
wishful thinking (for further discussion on this distinction, see Paglieri 2005).
The distinction between relevance and likeability provides us with a simple
framework to analyze the different impact that Peircean doubts and scary
doubts have on belief formation, and also to question separately the adaptive
value of these different mechanisms of goal-directed belief formation. It is easy
to see that Peircean doubts, and our reaction to them, concerns relevance alone:
in fact, relevance is precisely a measure of how much a certain information is
needed to advance the agent’s current plans, that is, of how many Peircean
doubts would be quenched by the corresponding belief, and how important
they are for the agent. It is also apparent that this bias is adaptively beneficial,
since beliefs are meant to serve as “maps by which we steer” (Ramsey 1931),
and the general direction of our behavior is obviously determined by goals. So
it is certainly a good thing that relevance prompt us to focus on goal-related
matters, thus keeping goals and beliefs in sync. Were it not so, we would find
ourselves ill equipped to pursue our current interests: for instance, we might
end up walking down the aisle at our own wedding with the head full of
thoughts on differential equations, but without a clue on how to behave with
our spouse-to-be. Indeed, when similar incidents happen, they are universally
regarded as disastrous, and diagnosed as bad cases of epistemic distraction.13
I suggest that their root cause is a failure of relevance.
Likeability, on the other hand, is uniquely tied to scary doubts anddefensive
beliefs: it is precisely when an information happens to be likeable or distasteful
for us (i.e. prone to satisfy or frustrate our goals) that we feel the pressure
to either believe or disbelieve it, independently from whatever evidence we
might have on the matter. Whether or not this tendency is adaptive constitutes
a thorny issue, that I would spell out as follows: Assuming likeability-induced
belief formation works as supposed, is it an effective mechanism, and in which
sense? It is certainly not infallible, since it can easily lead us to entertain false
beliefs (e.g. an overinflated opinion of ourselves, or a mistaken faith in the love
of our relatives). But is it typically fallacious, that is, does it produce more false
beliefs than true ones? This is an empirical question, one which will be very
difficult to answer and far exceeds the purpose of the present contribution.14
By way of mere speculation, I just want to stress that from the (evident) fact
that likeability often biases belief formation we should not immediately infer
that such process must have some evolutionary relevance or adaptive value.
13 By epistemic distraction I mean here an instance where the agent has a unique or dom-
inant goal, but fails to focus on the beliefs needed to pursue it effectively. Another type of
distraction can be labeled as motivational, and refers to instances where more than one goal
compete to catch the agent’s attention, so s/he ends up switching back and forth between
different tasks – cyber-slacking being a clear example of this phenomenon.
14 According to Mercier and Sperber (2011), this question is actually besides the point,
because the function of reasoning is not to deliver true belief, but to make us capable of
producing good arguments and assessing poor ones. This would make our belief system
highly adaptive, even if it turned out to produce a substantial body of falsehoods – that
would not been its purpose, after all. I am somewhat skeptical of this radical proposal, but
I acknowledge that it provides an interesting alternative to the standard account of belief,
worthy of greater attention in future work.
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This is of course true in general when we reason in evolutionary terms (not
all current traits are adaptations, for sure), but there are also special reasons
to be extra careful in assessing scary doubts and defensive beliefs. This is
why: as mentioned, the likeability bias is a side product of a basic feature
of goal-directed behavioral control, namely, the fact that goals are subjectively
satisfied by beliefs, not by facts. This is unavoidable, insofar as our perception of
external reality is filtered by our representational system. But it also creates a
vulnerability, because the belief that originally serves as a mere means to check
that the world has been changed according to plan, can later become an end in
itself, since goal satisfaction is in fact dependent on it. This is an instance of a
more general phenomenon in the dynamics of signs: once a stable association
is determined between a sign and its referent, so that we start reacting to the
sign as we would to the referent itself, then producing the sign is sufficient to
elicit our behavioral response. When we run out of the building to save our
life, we are reacting to the alarm, not to the fire – even if of course the reason
for doing so is because we assume the fire is there. Beliefs suffer the same fate:
insofar as they are conceived as reliable signs of the attainment or failure of
our goals (and we cannot help but conceiving them so), then the danger of
likeability bias immediately lurks in their shadow.
If this is correct, then the quest for an evolutionary justification of scary
doubts and defensive beliefs might well be a fool’s errand. Regardless of
how often such beliefs end up being correct or incorrect, the mechanism that
produces them would be more parsimoniously understood as a side effect of
a much larger adaptation – namely, our goal-oriented, cognitively mediated
action control system (Pezzulo and Castelfranchi 2009; Pezzulo this volume).
4 No doubts: the mind as a coherence-seeking device
Phenomenologically speaking, there is a sharp difference between a state of
doubt and a condition of ignorance. When in doubt, we are typically presented
with a finite number of competing options, all of which appear to us equally
plausible – or, at least, close enough in plausibility as to preclude a principled
choice in favor of one of them. Ignorance feels different: when we ignore
something, we are mostly in the dark about it, so that no option at all presents
itself as a candidate for belief or action. In spite of this phenomenological
difference, doubt and ignorance share something important: they both carries
a potential for internal inconsistency, that is, for the possibility of holding two
or more conflicting mental states. Such inconsistency is more manifest in our
doubts and more hidden in our ignorance, but the potential for it is present in
both cases. The ignorant is bydefinition open tomultiple possibilities (typically
far more than those entertained by a doubtful mind), and most of these options
are known to be mutually incompatible. Hence both doubt and ignorance can
be the harbinger of inconsistency.
This is relevant for our cognitive practices, not because ourmind is or should
be free of contradictions, but because for some classes of mental states, and
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only for them, we have a natural tendency to strive for coherence by removing
inconsistencies.15 On this view (Castelfranchi 2004; Paglieri 2006), the mind
is conceived as a coherence-seeking device, which is different from a coherence-
boundedmachine: in particular, the quest for coherence regards both epistemic
andmotivational attitudes, but is also limited to those attitudes that entail some
sort of commitment for the agent, i.e. beliefs and intentions, respectively; with
regard to more basic attitudes, such as data and desires, contradictions do not
pose any problem for our mind. Figure 1 summarizes this parallel between
the dynamics of epistemic and motivational states, whereas the details of
each process has been discussed in details elsewhere (see Paglieri 2004 for an
account of data-oriented belief formation, and Castelfranchi and Paglieri 2007
for an analysis of belief-based goal processing).
Fig. 1 The mind as a coherence-seeking device
It is the need to act effectively upon reality that prompts us to commit
ourselves to certain intentions and to endorse certain beliefs, moving beyond
ignorance and doubt – sometimes by an act of will, but mostly as a reaction
to whatever evidence we are presented with. It is in this sense that Peircean
doubts work as an irritant for cognition: they simultaneously indicate that
something needs to be ascertained in order to act, and also that there is the
potential for an inconsistency in our belief system, unless the matter is settled.
15 This is typically achieved either by making a choice among multiple conflicting candi-
dates, or by compartmentalizing, that is, segregating conflicting mental states into rigidly
separated areas of our mind (see Cherniak 1986 for in-depth discussion of the role of com-
partmentalization in human rationality).
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5 Conclusions
In this paper I took advantage of Peirce’s apt metaphor to distinguish two
types of doubt, and to analyze their different impact on belief formation.
In particular, I argued that Peircean doubts work as a beneficial irritant to
instigate informed guesses that are necessary for effective action, even though
they lead us occasionally astray. In contrast, scary doubts pressure us towards
self-serving beliefs, often regardless of factual evidence: this might or might
not be warranted on practical or prudential grounds, but it is certainly risky
business as a general epistemic habit. However, it is a vulnerability in our
belief formation system that we have to live with, insofar as it originates from
the practical need to (fallibly) determine whether a certain goal is attained.
This implies that “scratching our beliefs” (that is, letting our goals influence
our convictions) is always reasonable in the face of Peircean doubts, while it
might be a ruinous path down a slippery slope in matters of scary doubts.
Unfortunately, Peirce’s metaphor turns out to be devilishly accurate: as for
most irritations, refraining fromscratching our beliefs in the presence of doubts
is extremely hard, regardless of what made us itchy.
In unfolding this view of the connection between doubts, beliefs, and ac-
tions, I also tried to weave it within the rich fabric of Castelfranchi’s theory
of cognition and, more precisely, within his analysis of belief formation and
goal processing. The purpose of this exercise was not only to honor Castel-
franchi’s contribution to this area of inquiry, as it is customary on such an
occasion, but also to unearth a conceptual root that Peirce’s pragmatism and
Castelfranchi’s goal theory have in common. This is the primacy of action in our
understanding of the mind. For both these scholars, possibly for different rea-
sons, cognition is for action, first and foremost. It is so not only because goals
are mental attitudes on a par with beliefs (a lesson Castelfranchi never tires of
hammering into the mind of students and colleagues), but also because belief
formation itself is motivated and shaped by goals. Peirce’s irritation of doubt,
far from being the intellectual, methodological doubt advocated by Descartes,
is precisely a manifestation of how goals initiate and guide all our cognitive
undertakings, including the formation and revision of beliefs. Thus I dare to
say that Peirce and Castelfranchi would have shared the same doubts on any
theory of cognition that takes truth, rather than success, as its cornerstone.
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